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PROTECTION AGAINST THE DISCOVERY OR
DISCLOSURE OF CHURCH DOCUMENTS AND
RECORDS
JEFFREY HUNTER MOON *
INTRODUCTION
The subject of this discussion is the protection of documents and rec-
ords of churches and other religious organizations against discovery or
other disclosure. My goal is to be extensive, rather than intensive, and to
raise a variety of different ways to defend against document discovery,
particularly some that might not be obvious. Part I discusses protections
given by the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amend-
ment. Part II discusses defenses that can be interposed by way of the Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA").' Finally, Part III discusses
some potential state and common law defenses.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
First, in some circumstances the most basic sort of protection against
document discovery may be provided by the subject matter of the litigation
in question, since certain subject matters cannot constitutionally be de-
cided by civil courts because of the First Amendment's Free Exercise or
Establishment Clause protections.2
* Solicitor, United States Catholic Conference. A.B. cum laude, Middlebury College; J.D.,
Case Western Reserve University Law School. Mr. Moon has served in a broad range of gov-
ernment and corporate counsel positions, and is a former Assistant United States Attorney for
Washington, D.C.
1 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(1998). The United States Supreme Court has held that the RFRA is
unconstitutional as to state and local laws. See Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Later
cases have found the RFRA still to be effective as to federal laws. See, e.g., In re Young, 141
F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 43 (1998); In re Hodge, 220 B.R. 386 (D.
Idaho 1998); Morehouse v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. CIV.A.3:97-CV-0330-D, 1998
WL 320268, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 8, 1998).
2 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. Amend. I.
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A. Establishment Clause Limitations
I touch first on Establishment Clause issues. We are all generally
aware of the limits on a civil court's exercise of jurisdiction over a variety
of different kinds of issues-whether they are church property disputes,
the many variations of "priest malpractice" cases, or ministerial selection
and removal disputes.3 The Establishment Clause generally provides that
civil courts may not resolve disputes over the appointment of clergy 4 or
disputes over religious doctrines or teachings. When disputed religious is-
sues have been resolved by an authoritative church body, the rule is that
courts are to defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue made by the ap-
propriate ecclesiastical body.' One can argue by analogy that these cases
also apply in the discovery context. For example, if the question has to do
with the discovery of church documents relating to the appointment of
clergy, or documents that would relate to questions of doctrine or disputes
over religious issues, these cases offer support for a motion to quash, as
well as support for a dispositive motion based on the Establishment
Clause.6
Courts following Lemon v. Kurtzman7 decide Establishment Clause
questions based on the well-known three-part test of secular legislative
purpose, primary effect, and whether the challenged practice would foster
excessive entanglement between government and religion I should note
3 See Michael G. Weisberg, Balancing Cultural Integrity Against Individual Liberty: Civil
Court Review of Ecclesiastical Judgments, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 955, 960 (1992) (noting
that the "First Amendment's religion clauses prohibit civil authorities from resolving religious
controversies"); John E. Fennelly, Property Disputes and Religious Schisms: Who is the
Church?, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 319, 354 (1997) (recognizing that at the core of church prop-
erty dispute lies a religious question); see also Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian
Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952) (holding that a statute attempting to regulate
Church administration violated the First Amendment).
4 See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the U.S.A. and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696 (1976) (recognizing that "civil courts must accept that... an ecclesiastical determina-
tion... is not subject to judicial abrogation, having been reached by the final church judicatory
in which authority to make decision resides"); see also Kathleen Milner, Comment, Leaving
Secular Rights on the Church Steps: The Court of Appeals "Tinkers" with the Church-Minister
Employment Relationship-Black v. Snyder, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187, 191-92 (1991)
(noting that disputes concerning selection of clergy fall outside the purview of civil court juris-
diction).
5 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (noting that the First Amendment requires
civil courts to defer resolution of doctrinal issues to the highest court of a church organizational
hierarchy); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (concluding that civil courts are barred by First Amendment principles
from determining many ecclesiastical questions).
6 See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 595; Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 447.
7 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
' See id. at 612-13.
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here that the continued validity of Lemon may be in question because of
the 1997 Supreme Court case, Agostini v. Felton.9 Agostini was a success-
ful effort on the part of a group of Catholic school parents in New York, as
well as the Board of Education of the City of New York and the U.S. De-
partment of Education, to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in Agui-
lar v. Felton,10 and to permit remedial education programs under Title I to
be presented on the premises of parochial schools." The United States
Catholic Conference (" USCC") supported the parents and filed an amicus
brief in the matter, as did a number of other amici, urging not only that
Aguilar should be overturned, but that Lemon should be revisited and its
test revised as well. 2 In its decision in Agostini, the Court treated the "ex-
cessive entanglement" issue as simply a sub-part of the second, "primary
effect" prong of the Lemon test. This, combined with the Court's explicit
rejection of a number of judicial presumptions which formed the basis for
the Aguilar decision, has now substantially altered the Lemon test.' 3
Establishment Clause concerns, and specifically entanglement con-
cerns, have led to a series of opinions which hold that document discovery
sought by a litigant would create First Amendment problems. 4 The first
of the cases that I want to address is Word of Faith Outreach Center
Church, Inc. v. Morales.5 The Word of Faith case dealt with an attempt
on the part of Texas' Attorney General to apply that state's Deceptive
Trade Practices Act to the Word of Faith Outreach Center, an evangelical
Protestant organization. 6 The Attorney General commenced an investiga-
tion pursuant to that Act, which would have focused on claims and state-
9 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
'0 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
" See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 203. The Supreme Court stated that the Court in Aguilar
wrongly decided that the Tide I program resulted in excessive entanglement between Church
and State. See id.
12 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the USCC in Support of Petitioners, Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997) (Nos. 96-552, 96-553), available in 1997 WL 86237.
,3 A number of recent opinions had also cast doubt on the continued validity of the Lemon
test. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 852 (1995) (ob-
serving that cases involving the Establishment Clause cannot be resolved by a single test)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist, v. Grumet, 512
U.S. 687, 710 (1994) (stating that the decision arrived at was a departure from the factors enun-
ciated in Lemon) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
"4 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31-34 (1984) (protecting information
regarding identity of religious foundation donors and members); Baldwin v. C.I.R., 648 F.2d
483, 488 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that full compliance with discovery requests would result in
infringement on religious organizations' associational freedom).
" 787 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Tex. 1992), revd on other grounds, 986 F.2d 962 (5th Cir.
1993).
'" See id. at 691.
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ments made in the Center's written and broadcast materials. 7 The court
decided that the Attorney General could not constitutionally be permitted
to do such an investigation, or to obtain those records and documents, be-
cause to do so would violate the Establishment Clause." The court offered
a number of reasons for that conclusion. First, the Attorney General would
have been obliged to determine which of the Center's publications and ac-
tivities were religious and which were not. 9 Second, there was a concern
on the part of the Fifth Circuit that any such investigation could lead to
ongoing state monitoring and regulation of the religious activities of the
Word of Faith Outreach Center.2° Third, the Attorney General's activities
could lead to evaluations of the legitimacy of religious practices them-
selves.2' While the opinion in the case did not specifically strike down any
particular document production request, the Fifth Circuit referred explic-
itly to the problematic potential for the review of internal church docu-
ments," and Word of Faith could be of great help in situations raising
document discovery problems.
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 23 is a
Fourth Circuit case which involved a female plaintiff who had been denied
a position as pastor at a Seventh-Day Adventist church. She claimed sex
discrimination, and brought a Title VII claim against her denomination.24
The court, as is typical in ministerial non-selection claims, refused to adju-
dicate the claims for Establishment Clause reasons; to do so would require
the court to decide who would minister for the church, an inevitably relig-
ious question.25 It also spoke directly to the document production issue,
and wrote that "[c]hurch... records would inevitably become subject to
subpoena, discovery, cross-examination, the full panoply of legal process
designed to probe the mind of the church in the selection of its minis-
ters."26 The court concluded that those inquiries would relate to non-
justiciable questions, would create the potential for pervasive monitoring
by public authorities, and would infringe upon "precisely those Establish-
ment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of excessive entangle-
ment." 27
17 See id.
IS See id. at 698.
'9 See id. at 699 n. 10.
20 See id. at 702.
21 See id. at 701-02.
2 See id. at 706.
23 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986).
24 See id. at 1165.
25 See id. at 1168.
26 Id. at 1171.
27 Id.
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In another ministerial non-selection case, Minker v. Baltimore Annual
Conference of United Methodist Church,28 the D.C. Circuit made a similar
decision. It dismissed the claims made by a Protestant minister that he had
been refused a pastor's position because of his age and in breach of an im-
plied contract." The court stated that "any inquiry into the Church's rea-
sons for asserting that Minker was not suited for a particular pastorship
would constitute an excessive entanglement in its affairs."3 However, the
court went on to state that the plaintiff would be permitted to proceed with
an express contract claim so long as he did not resort to "impermissible
avenues of discovery," which were described as being those that would
create an excessive entanglement.3 The court was very explicit in this
case: it limited the appropriate boundaries of litigation to only those areas
legitimate for court inquiry and resolution, and then clearly limited per-
missible discovery to those areas.32
In much the same vein is United Methodist Church v. White.33 In that
case the court wrote: "The First Amendment's Establishment Clause and
Free Exercise Clause grant churches an immunity from civil discovery and
trial under certain circumstances in order to avoid subjecting religious in-
stitutions to defending their religious beliefs and practices in a court of
law."34  Clearly, the more easily one can fit one's situation into the
MinkeriWhite mold, the more effectively one will be able to resist docu-
ment or records discovery.
The Word of Faith opinion emphasized one particular factor ad-
dressed by a number of cases: the special Establishment Clause problems
created by continuing or ongoing state investigations or surveillance of
church operations. 35 Any such ongoing or pervasive state investigation
would create a danger of interfering with or influencing religious decision-
making, thus creating an Establishment Clause problem. Apart from Word
of Faith, I draw your attention to NLRB v. Catholic Bishop,36 in which the
Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of an NLRB order which would have
asserted jurisdiction over the lay faculty at Catholic schools.37 The deci-
21 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
29 See id. at 1358.
'o Id. at 1360.
31 Id.
32 See id. at 1358-60.
3' 571 A.2d 790 (D.D.C. 1990).
34 Id. at 792.
35 See Word of Faith, 787 F. Supp. 689, 698 (W.D. Tex. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 986
F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1993).
36 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977), aftd, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
37 See id. at 1130-31.
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sion was made on statutory and constitutional grounds." The Supreme
Court affirmed, 39 and provided a detailed discussion of the First Amend-
ment concerns leading to that affirmance. Specifically, in relation to po-
tential unfair labor practice charges, the Court stated:
[T]he resolution of such charges... will necessarily involve inquiry into
the good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its
relationship to the school's religious mission. It is not only the conclu-
sions that may be reached by the Board which may impinge on rights
guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry
[itself] .... 40
The Court also noted that one outgrowth of permitting the NLRB to
exercise jurisdiction over the faculty at Catholic schools would be that the
Board could then, under some circumstances, decide the terms and condi-
tions of Catholic teachers' employment. The Court held that such control
would necessarily raise sensitive Establishment Clause issues.4"
Another significant case bearing on Establishment Clause concerns is
Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets.42 Surinach involved the Puerto Rican
Department of Consumer Affairs' investigation of the operating costs of
Catholic and other schools. The investigation sought to probe whether
violations were occurring with respect to Puerto Rico's price control
rules.43 If so, the Department of Consumer Affairs was charged with stop-
ping those violations and enforcing Puerto Rico's price controls.44 The
Department appeared to have virtually unlimited investigatory authority,
pursuant to that mandate. In Surinach, the Department of Consumer Af-
fairs had subpoenaed documents from Catholic and other schools regard-
ing expenses, costs, charges, and other similar records, and these subpoe-
" See id. The court, examining the statute that served as a basis for the NLRB's authority,
concluded:
A church which chooses to educate its own young people in schools which it is re-
quired essentially to finance without governmental aid should because of the essen-
tially religious permeation of its curriculum be equally freed of the obviously inhib-
iting effect and impact of the restrictions of the National Labor Relations Act....
Id. at 1130. Buttressing this conclusion with a constitutional analysis, the court explained "there
are aspects in the present cases.., not only of... religious activity under the establishment
clause but.., also curtailment of the free exercise of religion under the second prong of the Re-
ligion clauses." Id. at 1131. Accordingly, in the interest of separating church and state, the court
set aside the NLRB's orders concerning the lay teachers in a Catholic school. See id.
39 See NLRB v. Catholic Bishops of Chic., 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979).
40 Id. at 502.
41 See id. at 503.
42 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979).
43 See id. at 74.
44 See id.
PROTECTION OF CHURCH DOCUMENTS
nas were challenged.4" Ultimately, the First Circuit ruled that Puerto
Rico's ongoing evaluation and inquiries into Catholic school tuition risked
impermissible state intrusion into religious decisions concerning the ex-
penditure of funds.' Such involvement would permit the state to intrude
upon decisions of religious authority, such as how much money should be
spent, for what sorts of teaching, and how funds should best be allotted to
serve the religious goals of the schools. Such involvement would also
permit the Department of Consumer Affairs to make decisions about lim-
iting those expenditures and imposing restrictions on the amounts that the
religious schools could charge.47 This was all found to threaten excessive
governmental interference with church schools, and was invalidated.48 A
similar approach was followed in Bangor Baptist Church v. State of
Maine;49 Taylor v. City of Knoxville;5" and Sylte v. Metropolitan Govern-
ment of Nashville,5' each of which hold that ongoing government investi-
gation or regulation of church-related activity is constitutionally impermis-
sible.52
A second factor that the courts have particularly emphasized in Es-
tablishment Clause cases is the danger of government participation in de-
termining what constitutes religious behavior in the first instance. This
concern was raised in Word of Faith Outreach Center53 and in the Supreme
Court's decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,54
as well as in Lemon v. Kurtzman" itself. In Barnette, the Court wrote:
"[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
41 See id at 73-74.
4 See id. at 77-78.
47 See id.
41 See id. at 79-80.
49 549 F. Supp. 1208, 1224 (D. Me. 1982) (denying state's summary judgment motion
made in defense of plaintiff-church's claim of excessive entanglement in school policies).
50 566 F. Supp. 925, 930 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) ("Laws allowing an investigation into the fi-
nancial affairs of religious institutions have been held unconstitutional as an impermissible en-
tanglement of the affairs of church and state.").
"' 493 F. Supp. 313, 319-20 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (declaring an ordinance that would allow
the government to interfere with religious activities unconstitutional and enjoining its enforce-
ment).
52 See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that the
EEOC's two-year investigation of the university was an excessive, "impermissible" entangle-
ment).
13 787 F. Supp. at 702 (stating that the Texas statute at issue would "require the Attorney
General to make determinations as to which representations are purely religious and which are
secular .... [T]his Court does not believe they or any other state officials are authorized to
make those kind of determinations").
5 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
" 403 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1971) (recognizing that teachers would "find it hard to make a
total separation between secular teaching and religious doctrine").
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official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in... relig-
ion...." 56 Thus, if a case is presented in which a demand or request for
church documents is made to determine whether behavior is religious or
whether it conforms to a particular religious orthodoxy, these cases may be
helpful in resisting such document production requests.57
In the course of this analysis, it is necessary to discuss one case,
United States v. Moon,58 which is sometimes cited as contrary authority.
Moon involved an inquiry into some of the financial dealings of Sun
Myung Moon, the Korean religious leader. Moon was charged with filing
false tax returns and other forms of tax evasion.59 The question raised in
Moon was whether the court was required to charge the jury in his tax eva-
sion trial that it must accept as conclusive the Unification Church's defini-
tion of what a "religious purpose" was.' Moon claimed that since he was
"the Church," any use that he made of money was necessarily a church-
related activity, thus, no tax could be owed.6' Not surprisingly, the Second
Circuit disagreed with this position.62 The court stated that an individual
unavoidably has a separate identity from his role as a church leader, and
that the First Amendment does not insulate a church or its members from
judicial inquiry when they are charged with criminal violations.63 Within
this context, the court explained: "in this criminal proceeding [for tax eva-
sion] the jury was not bound to accept the Unification Church's definition
of what constitutes a religious use or purpose." ' I raise Moon particularly
because of this broad-reaching language, which could be used out of con-
text in civil litigation.
Now I want to outline some specific kinds of church-related disputes,
in which requests for church records or documents could arise. One such
56 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
57 See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (emphasizing that individuals' re-
ligious beliefs differ and that the Founding Fathers "fashioned a charter of government which
envisaged the widest possible toleration of conflicting views"), rev'd on other grounds, 329
U.S. 187 (1946); David J. Young & Steven W. Tigges, Discovery and Use of Church Records by
Civil Authorities, 30 CATH. LAw. 198, 200 (1986) (stressing that the government is prohibited
from defining whether something is religious).
58 718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984).
'9 See id. at 1216. Reverend Moon was charged with one count of conspiracy to file false
federal income tax returns, one count of obstruction of justice and of making false statements to
government agencies, and three counts of filing false tax returns. See id.
60 See id. at 1226. According to the Church, "any use of these funds by Reverend Moon
was for religious purposes." Id.
61 Id. at 1227.
62 See id.
63 See id. at 1227-28. According to the court, accepting Moon's contentions "would be to
permit church leaders to stand above the law." Id. at 1228.
64 Id. at 1227.
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instance would be church property disputes like the kind of situation en-
countered in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.65 In Kedroff, the Supreme
Court held that the New York State Religious Corporations Law was un-
constitutional." That statute had purported to transfer control of real prop-
erty belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church from its governing hierar-
chy to the governing authorities of the Russian Church in America.67 The
court found that "a transfer by statute of control over churches" violated
the rule of" separation between church and state."6
Civil courts can decide questions regarding the ownership of real
property only in accordance with the law of real property, trusts and es-
tates, but cannot decide questions of internal church practice.69 Courts
must defer to the highest ecclesiastical authority of the church and not take
the further step of inquiring into religious doctrine.70 Where a document or
records request would relate only to such prohibited inquiry, cases such as
Milivojevich may be used to support objections or motions to quash.7"
A related area involves claims against churches by church personnel.
Cases which involved discovery questions include the Rayburn and Minker
cases mentioned previously,72 as well as McClure v. Salvation Army.73
Language from the Fifth Circuit in McClure is instructive. The court
wrote that Title VII could not be applied to the relationships between a
65 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
6 See id. at 107.
67 See id.
6 Id. at 110. Similarly, in both Jones and Hull Church, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the civil courts, in resolving real property disputes, are severely restricted by the First Amend-
ment from analyzing church doctrines. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-06; Hull Church, 393 U.S. at
445-49.
69 See, e.g., Jones, 443 U.S. at 604 (holding that civil courts may use "the neutral principles
approach" when resolving property disputes because this approach enables civil courts to ex-
amine certain religious documents, yet remains consistent with constitutional principles); Hull
Church, 393 U.S. at 449 (The First Amendment "commands civil courts to decide church prop-
erty disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine").
7o See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709. In Milivojevich, Justice Brennan stated "the First and
Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest
ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as
binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them."
Id.; see also Maryland and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that the First
Amendment obligates civil courts to accept a church's resolution of religious issues).
7 See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713 (stating that civil courts are bound to accept the deci-
sions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization on "matters of discipline, faith, in-
ternal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law").
72 See supra notes 23 and 28 and accompanying text.
'3 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian
Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991) (declining to apply to Title VII to church-affiliated
hospital based on the excessive entanglement test).
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church and its ministers because that "must necessarily be recognized as
[a] prime ecclesiastical concern."74 The court stated that if it permitted
such litigation to be pursued, it "would involve an investigation and re-
view of these practices and decisions and would, as a result, cause the
State to intrude upon matters of church administration and government." 75
The court concluded that this "could only produce by its coercive effect
the very opposite of [the] separation of church and State." 76 It follows,
then, that document or discovery requests for records as part of such an in-
vestigative process would raise similar issues.
Numerous cases have addressed the issue of investigations into
church activities similar to the ones in Catholic Bishop and Surinach.77
One of these cases I want to discuss in detail is Vernon v. City of Los An-
geles.7" It should be noted first, however, that the Catholic Bishop and
Surinach line of cases come to varying results depending on the degree of
intrusiveness of the inquiries at issue, the length of an investigation or re-
view, and the potential for government restriction of religious beliefs,
among other factors. One must recognize frankly that this is not a "yes-
no" type of analysis; just because an Establishment Clause question is le-
gitimately raised does not mean that the question has been answered. The
court will have to evaluate how much intrusion there is, how much investi-
gative activity or monitoring there will be, and how great a potential for
genuine impact on religious activities a given governmental activity poses.
Catholic Bishop gives us an example of what that kind of analytic process
might look like.
The Vernon case is an interesting one. It involved an Assistant Chief
of Police in Los Angeles who claimed that a City Council investigation
into his alleged religious proselytizing and religiously-discriminatory
practices in running a division of the police department, would be so ex-
tensive and intrusive an investigation that it would violate both the Estab-
74 McClure, 460 F.2d at 559.
75 Id. at 560.
76 Id.
77 See Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding no constitu-
tional violations on federal or state level where there was no continuing investigation); New Life
Baptist Academy v. East Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1989) (concluding that the school
district's method of certifying private schools did not violate the First Amendment); Dayton
Christian Schs. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm., 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985) rev'd on other
grounds, 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (holding that the Ohio Civil Rights Commission investigation into
a Christian school that would involve production of all personnel policies, internal operating
procedures, personnel files of 14 teachers, and handbooks would violate the Establishment and
Free Exercise clauses).
78 27 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1994).
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lishment and Free Exercise clauses.79 The Ninth Circuit disagreed. The
court pointed out that this was a one-time investigation, focused only on
specific claims of secular wrongdoing regarding misuse of his office, and
that the inquiries were only related to his on-duty conduct as an employee
of the city."0 Thus, the court held that the purpose of the inquiry was
secular and did not have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibit-
ing religion.8' The investigation would not excessively entangle the gov-
ernment with religion because there would be no ongoing relationship or
investigation at all, let alone any form of potential control of religious or-
ganizations or religious decision-making on the part of the state.82 As a re-
sult, the Ninth Circuit held that the City Council's investigation was not
one that violated the Establishment Clause. 3
In New Life Baptist Church Academy v. East Longmeadow,4 the First
Circuit faced a similar issue concerning a state proposal to make inquiries
to determine whether certain standards of teacher certification in religious
schools were met." The First Circuit found that the state's proposal did
not violate the Establishment Clause.86 The Sixth Circuit, however, has
held that an investigation that involved the production of personnel poli-
cies and internal operating procedures, personnel files of a number of
teachers, handbooks and other extensive revelations of internal church and
church-school records, would violate the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses. 7
" See Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1390.
"o See id. at 1397-1400.
" See id. at 1399-1400.
82 See id.
8 See id. at 1401.
885 F.2d 940, 953-54 (1st Cir. 1989).
See id.
6 See id.
87 See Dayton Christian Sch., Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932, 949-51 (6th
Cir. 1985), rev'd and remanded sub nom, Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch.,
Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986). Some further discussions of Dayton Christian Schools may be in or-
der. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision and remanded based on Younger
abstention principles. See id. at 625-26. There is also dicta from the Court which appears to sup-
port the idea that neither the government's administrative investigation of sex discrimination by
the Dayton Christian Schools, nor the government's conduct of an administrative hearing re-
garding those claims, would in and of itself be prohibited by the First Amendment. See 477 U.S.
at 628. In my view, this is because of the peculiar procedural posture of the case when it came
under Supreme Court review. The Supreme Court's view was that the school had not had any
formal opportunity to put forth its religious reasons for its conduct, or its religious reasons for
believing that its conduct should not be examined by the state of Ohio in the first place. See id.
at 629. The Court pointed out that after the commission had rendered a final order and the
school had offered justifications for its actions, the state of Ohio could dismiss the complaints
after investigation, find that it had no jurisdiction in the first place to conduct such an investiga-
tion, or decide to impose no sanctions at all for constitutional reasons. See id. None of those is-
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The disclosure of financial records to the IRS and others is a topic
which has warranted attention in the Establishment Clause context. One of
the major cases in that area is United States v. Freedom Church." In
Freedom Church, the First Circuit held that an IRS subpoena for church
financial records would be enforced where the IRS's activities posed no
threat of a continuing inquiry into the church's activities, and where there
would be no apparent government involvement or control exerted over the
church's activities. s In essence, the IRS was simply trying to ascertain the
facts necessary to decide upon Freedom Church's tax-exempt status. 90
Thus, there was no genuine risk of an Establishment Clause violation. To
the same substantive effect, though couched in Free Exercise terminology,
is United States v. Holmes,9 which held that requiring the Miletus Church
to comply with a "properly narrowed summons" in order to demonstrate
its entitlement to tax exempt status, would place, at most, an incidental
burden on the free exercise of religion.92 This burden was outweighed by
the substantial government interest in maintaining the integrity of its tax
policies, and could be entirely avoided if the church decided not to pursue
that particular government benefit.93 In Ambassador College v. Geotzke,9
the court addressed a financial disclosure request by a private plaintiff.
The case involved the transfer of a deed, where the plaintiff sought can-
cellation of the transfer on the grounds of undue influence exerted over the
deceased transferor by either the church or the college.95 The church con-
tested the subpoena, alleging First Amendment violations, but because
there was no potential for significant government monitoring or influence
on a church or any of its affiliated entities, the Fifth Circuit ordered the
church to comply with discovery. 96 Ambassador College, of course, in-
volved a private tort suit, and none of the factors that favored court inter-
sues had yet been reached because the inquiry was at a very early stage. See id. at 624. How-
ever, there is language from the Court that supports the position that an extensive inquiry into
the personnel policies of Dayton Christian Schools for the sake of eliminating sex discrimina-
tion might have been legitimate. See id. at 628. I believe that such use of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Dayton Christian Schools would be inappropriate, where the Supreme Court only
decided to reverse and remand because the District Court should have abstained in the first in-
stance. See id. at 625.
88613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1987).
9 See id. at 320.
90 See id.
9' 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980).
92 Id. at 989.
9' See id. at 990.
94 675 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1982).
9' See id. at 662-63.
96 See id. at 664.
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vention in the discovery process in Surinach97 were found to exist. 9
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA") 99 has engendered a
number of Establishment Clause cases relating to its record-keeping re-
quirements. Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church" and Tony and Susan
Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor'0 ' generally hold that the FLSA's
record-keeping requirements do not violate the Establishment Clause. 2 In
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization,"3 the plaintiff, Jimmy
Swaggart, took a somewhat different approach to a related issue, alleging
that sales and use tax requirements imposed a severe administrative burden
on the church, and so were unconstitutional.'t 4 The Court held that the in-
creased payroll expenses which are attendant upon compliance with the
FLSA's record-keeping requirements, do not violate the Free Exercise
Clause.'15
B. Free Exercise Limitations
This leads me into the next major portion of my discussion: Free Ex-
ercise limitations on document and records discovery. The Free Exercise
Clause generally protects against government interference with, or coer-
cion of, religious belief or expression."° Before the decision in Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, 7 the standards generally applicable to a Free Ex-
ercise claim were stated in Wisconsin v. Yoder'08 and Sherbert v. Verner.'09
Generally, if a litigant showed that a challenged government action inter-
fered with his religious liberty by coercing actions contrary to the tenets of
his religion, then the state would be required to show that the impact on
religious liberty was justified by a "compelling state interest," and that the
governmental actions taken were the least restrictive alternative means
9 See Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979).
90 See id. at 663-64.
99 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1996).
100 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990).
101 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
"2 See Dole, 899 F.2d at 1399; Alamo, 471 U.S. at 305-306.
103 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
'04 See id. at 393.
'05 See id. at 392.
106 See Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that state stat-
ute requiring Bible reading in public schools violated Free Exercise clause).
107 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (stating that compelling governmental interest test was not
applicable to neutral criminal statute addressing particular conduct).
l08 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (reasoning that only state interests of the highest level can
outweigh valid claims to the free exercise of religion).
100 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (noting that one who believes in Sunday worship should not
lose any benefits or seniority, or be forced into working on a Sunday, even in a national emer-
gency).
39 CATHOLIC LAWYER, NO. 1
available to the government to meet that compelling need. This same ba-
sic standard was adopted by Congress, in statutory form, in the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA").110 A number of cases have ap-
proached the question of whether the production of church documents and
records could, if forced by the state, violate the Free Exercise Clause. "
Note first that the Vernon case discussed above also had an important
Free Exercise component."' Assistant Chief Vernon claimed that his
rights to freely exercise his own religious beliefs, to consult with church
elders, and to pursue religiously required efforts at proselytism, would be
interfered with by the City Council investigation at issue.' The Ninth
Circuit held that the investigation would impose no substantial burden at
all on Vernon's claimed religious practices, because there was no evidence
that the city ever monitored his private religious activities. Furthermore,
Vernon failed to show that any of his religious practices had been inter-
fered with or "chilled" in any objectively discernable way. 114
Word of Faith Outreach Center also had a Free Exercise component.
One of the bases on which the court decided to prohibit the Texas Attorney
General from proceeding with his investigation of issues significant under
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Consumer Protection Act"' was that
it could lead to forced disclosure of documents or information which could
unduly burden a church member's free exercise rights."6 Another recent
"0 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1 (1998). Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872, probably
would not apply in the sorts of situations we are dealing with, in any event. First, Smith does not
deal, at least on its face, with any question of evidentiary privilege. Rather, it dealt with the
question whether the otherwise-illegal use of hallucinogens was constitutionally required to be
permitted for certain religious employees. See id. at 876. Second, by Smith's own terms, the dis-
covery process, when confronted by an evidentiary privilege claim, is a system of individual
exemptions, under which arguably the state may not refuse to extend that system to cases of re-
ligious hardship without a compelling reason. See id. at 883-84. And third, Smith did not address
or alter the degree of deference which is constitutionally required to be accorded to internal re-
ligious beliefs and practices, such as the confidentiality of internal church documents. See id. at
886-87.
.. See eg., St. German of Alaska Eastern Orthodox Catholic Church v. United States, 840
F.2d 1087 (2d Cir. 1988); Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. 610 (D. Utah 1990).
"' Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1994).
.. See id. at 1390.
"1 See id. at 1394-95.
15 SeeTEx. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §17.41 et seq. (West 1994).
116 See Word of Faith Outreach Center, 986 F.2d at 963. The district court concluded that
the Attorney General's demand for the Church's membership and/or contributor list was an in-
fringement of the First Amendment right to associate. See id. at 967. The Court of Appeals re-
versed the district court's decision due to a jurisdictional rather than substantive reason. The
Court of Appeals found that there were unsettled state law issues that would render moot the
federal constitutional claims. Id. at 963. Thus, the court concluded that the district court should
have abstained from exercising its jurisdiction in accordance with Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See id. at 963.
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case explaining the rationale for applying Free Exercise defenses to docu-
ment production is Hadnot v. Shaw."7 Its opinion provides:
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits civil courts from inquiring into any
phase of ecclesiastical decisionmaking-its merits as well as proce-
dure .... Because religious judicature is immune from any civil court in-
quest, it is also protected from intrusion by discovery. The church's im-
munity from disclosure rests neither on a statute nor a code of evidence.
Rather its shield is of a constitutional dimension. It is founded on the
Free Exercise Clause's prohibition against secular re-examination of
merits and procedure in ecclesiastical judicature. 18
Let me spend some time addressing a case that further illustrates the
fundamental ,concepts underlying church immunity from discovery, as ar-
ticulated by the Hadnot court. USCC/NCCB v. Ashby," 9 a case I was in-
volved in personally, is still ongoing with different defendants. In Ashby, a
Texas trial court ordered the production of many different categories of
internal USCC/NCCB documents in a Texas sex abuse case. The plaintiffs
sought to demonstrate that the USCC was both present in Texas at relevant
times, and had essentially participated in a "cover-up" conspiracy with the
local diocese and priests that were allegedly involved. The plaintiffs re-
quested many different categories of documents, which the trial court or-
dered to be produced. Leaving aside the fact that many of the categories of
documents were already covered by attorney-client 20 and work product'
privileges, we argued that documents reflecting religious deliberations and
closed meetings of bishops, or having to do with ordination, supervision or
discipline of clergy, as well as church responses to people harmed by cler-
gymen, were all privileged. We were ultimately forced to commence
mandamus proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court.'
I raise Ashby in this context, because we argued before the trial and
appellate courts, and in our mandamus papers, that the documents in ques-
tion were not genuinely relevant, and so, discoverable, because they could
only be pertinent to constitutionally impermissible inquiries on the part of
the court. We pointed out the constitutional limits on secular adjudication,
and how those limits interrelated with the discovery issues in question.
'" 826 P.2d 978, 988-89 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1992).
11 Id. at 988-99 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted); see also David J. Young & Ste-
ven W. Tigges, Discovery and Use of Church Records by Civil Authorities, 30 CATH. LAW. 198,
208 (1986) (discussing elements of Free Exercise and its implications on requiring disclosure of
church records).
"9 No. 93-5258-G (Tex. Trial Ct., 134th Jud. Dist. Dallas County).
120 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(l) and (3).
121 See Fed. R. Civ.P. 26(b)(3).
'2 No. 95-0250 (Texas Sup. Ct.).
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The essence of the plaintiffs' theory was that the Conferences had author-
ity over the bishops' conduct and should have made it a higher priority to
study and teach about the problem of sex abuse by deviant priests, and
could have implemented appropriate controls. Therefore, the plaintiffs al-
leged, the Conferences were negligent in having failed to devote more at-
tention to that issue. The plaintiffs, in the alternative, argued that if the
Conferences did not have the ability to control and direct the conduct of
individual bishops, then the Conferences were negligent in that they did
not seek to have the relationship between bishops and the Conferences re-
structured so that they would have had that authority.' We argued that
these alternative arguments struck directly to the core of religious liberty
and the bishops' right to freely exercise their own religious beliefs, and of
the Catholic Church's right to operate and organize itself as it saw fit.
Their claims were liable, we argued, to entangle the court continually in
disputed issues of church law, church organization and church policy, and
ultimately would put the secular courts in the position of having to decide
the legitimacy of a variety of religious decisions. So, for those reasons, we
appealed, lost, and brought the issue on mandamus to the Texas Supreme
Court. Rather than arguing the case, the plaintiffs ultimately surrendered,
dismissing their claims against the Conferences on the last business day
before argument was scheduled, thus mooting these issues for purposes of
that case.
Surinach was another case that dealt with the relationships between
church and state, involving the Puerto Rican Department of Consumer Af-
fairs' requests for church and other religious school's financial records. In
addressing the question of Free Exercise, the First Circuit decided that to
permit such an investigation to go forward might impinge upon the relig-
ious beliefs and practices of those that administered and attended the
schools. 24 Since the state could not demonstrate that the potential burden
on religion was justified by any compelling state interest, or was the least
restrictive means of achieving that state interest, the court held that the in-
quiries would not be permitted.'25 The court's reasoning demonstrates that
the compelled production of financial records or documents may in itself
infringe upon the Free Exercise Clause.
Another case relating to this issue is Scott v. Hammock,'26 in which
" See Nicholas P. Cafardi, Discovering the Secret Archives: Evidentiary Privileges for
Church Records, 10 J.L. & REL. 95, 95 (1993/1994) (noting the popularity of lawsuits under
theories of negligent selection, negligent assignment or negligent supervision of clergy, espe-
cially in relation to sexual misconduct).
124 See Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73, 74 (1st Cir. 1979).
125 See id. at 79-80.
126 133 F.R.D. 610 (D. Utah 1990).
PROTECTION OF CHURCH DOCUMENTS
the petitioner attempted to obtain records of the Mormon Church regarding
the opposing party's excommunication proceedings, hoping, through those
records, to show a prior history of child abuse on the part of the other
party. Because these records were part of a church proceeding, conducted
as part of the official disciplinary protocol of the church and protected
within the LDS Church, they were held protected against discovery even
though they were not part of any formal confessional process.'27 Lawyers
intending to rely on Scott should also be aware of Ellis v. United States,2 '
which held that the tape recordings of meetings between a volunteer, su-
pervising a youth group on a hike, and LDS church leaders, were not pro-
tected by clergy privilege.'29 The court found that these communications
were initiated in order to discuss what future activities the church's youth
groups should take part in. 30 The court found that these communications
were not made for doctrinal, spiritual or religious purposes, but rather to
report to church leaders the details and circumstances of a tragic accident
during the hike. Thus, in light of the purposes for creation of these re-
cordings, the court held that ordering the records disclosed would not pose
an undue burden on any free exercise rights.
Cimijotti v. Paulsen13 1 is in some ways analogous to Scott. In Cimi-
jotti, the Eighth Circuit denied a litigant's ex-wife access to communica-
tions made by another of his ex-wives to the church in the course of a
separate maintenance proceeding. The court held that the communications
were privileged because they were part of a church-sanctioned proceeding,
required to be kept confidential pursuant to church teachings.' 32 The court
rejected the discovery attempts being made with respect to the church
documents. 133
There are other cases, though, in which claims of confidentiality have
not been successful. They include Keenan v. Gigante,'34 which rejected a
priest's claim of confidentiality because the discussions in question could
not legitimately be described either as part of a formal confession, or as
part of any kind of a church-sanctioned, confidential proceeding. Simi-
127 See id. at 619.
121 922 F. Supp. 539 (D. Utah 1996).
129 See id. at 543.
130 See id. For another case in which the issue of privilege was problematic, see also USCC
v. ARM, 487 U.S. 72 (1998), where the Conferences were held in contempt after they informed
the court that they could not "in conscience comply with the subpoenas in question .. " Id. at
75.
1' 340 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1965). The Cimijotti district court opinions are reported at 219 F.
Supp. 621 (N.D. Iowa 1963), and 230 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Iowa 1964).
132 See Cimjotti, 340 F.2d at 613.
133 See id. (affirming summary judgement for the defendants).
134 390 N.E.2d 1151 (N.Y. 1979).
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larly, in In re Rabbinical Seminary,13 the court denied a seminary's mo-
tion to quash a subpoena for financial records, which would have had a di-
rect bearing on the government's investigation of fraudulently obtained
student loans. 136 The seminary did not meet its burden to show that there
were any particular religious provisions which would have prevented
turning over these records, or that the records revealed anything that for
religious reasons was required to be kept confidential. The court held that
the production of the records would not violate any religious tenet, or oth-
erwise impose an unfair burden on religion to such a degree that it would
override the compelling state interest in investigating the crime. Thus, the
court rejected a Free Exercise defense against production of the seminary's
financial records.'37
II. PROTECTION UNDER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
(RFRA)
The second major part of this discussion deals with the defenses that
can be interposed using the RFRA directly. In Vernon, described above,'38
the court addressed the RFRA and outlined the "substantial burden,"
"compelling state interest" and "narrowly tailored" standards. While the
Vernon opinion did not deal specifically with document production, the
decision clearly provides a statutory basis that may be used to extend the
logic of other Free Exercise cases, and to secure remedies under the
RFRA. That is, because the Ninth Circuit in Vernon held that a "state ac-
tor's" violation of Free Exercise rights can be remedied under the RFRA,
the RFRA can provide a useful jurisdictional basis for attempting to rem-
edy Free Exercise violations.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Mockaitis v. Harcleroad,139 has re-
cently received a lot of attention. Mockaitis is a case in which our office
was deeply involved, from the standpoint of trying to give assistance to the
lead counsel for Archbishop George and the Archdiocese of Portland in
Oregon, as well as through our own amicus participation in the case.
Mockaitis involved two defendants who were suspected of committing a
truly heinous triple kidnapping/rape/murder in the Portland area. The de-
133 450 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
136 Seeid. at 1085.
1 See id. at 1081-83; see also United States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985, 990 (5th Cir. 1980)
(rejecting claim that IRS subpoena was improper on Free Exercise grounds, holding that
"[b]alanced against the incidental burden on church religious activities is the substantial gov-
ernment interest in maintaining the integrity of its fiscal policies .... This interest is sufficiently
compelling to justify any incidental infringement of plaintiff's First Amendment rights").
138 See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
1 104 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1997).
PROTECTION OF CHURCH DOCUMENTS
fendants were being held in the Lane County Jail when the District Attor-
ney caused recordings to be made and transcribed of exchanges between
Fr. Mockaitis, a priest of the Diocese of Portland, and one of the defen-
dants. 4° The suspect had specifically requested to see a priest for the pur-
pose of making a confession, and the priest was known, by jail personnel,
to have come to the jail for that particular reason. The exchanges between
the defendant and Fr. Mockaitis took place in that context.'
41
Early on, attempts were made on the part of the Archdiocese to con-
vince the District Attorney not to use these tapes. The Archdiocese asked
that the tapes and their transcripts be destroyed. 2 Those efforts failed.
Subsequently, the Archbishop submitted a motion to the state trial court to
which the criminal actions were then assigned. The motion was rejected
out of hand, simply by way of a letter from the judge of the state court,
stating that the attempts of the Archdiocese to participate in a criminal
proceeding were improper and that its position, whatever it may be, would
not be given any consideration whatsoever.'43 Subsequently, the Arch-
bishop filed an action on his own behalf in U.S. District Court. He made
claims under the RFRA, the Omnibus Crime Control Act (what we gener-
ally think of as "the Wiretapping Statute"), as well as the First and Fourth
Amendments to the Constitution, via section 1983 of title 42 of the United
States Code.'" Both the Archdiocese and Fr. Mockaitis were unsuccessful
in the District Court, which found that it had to abstain based upon the Su-
preme Court's decision in Younger v. Harris.'45 The District Court also
took the opportunity, entirely unnecessarily in my view, to conclude that
the defendants' rights to a fair trial would have outweighed the Archdio-
cese's and Fr. Mockaitis' First Amendment interests if that question had
been reached."4
Ultimately the Ninth Circuit agreed with us that the decision was
clearly erroneous, and found that the District Court did not have any obli-
gation to abstain under Younger because Fr. Mockaitis and the Archdio-
cese did not have a reasonable opportunity to litigate their claims in the
state court system. Indeed, they had tried to raise their concerns in the
'40 See id. at 1524-25.
141 See id. at 1525-27.
'42 See id. at 1526.
141 See id. (explaining that such a motion was "not permitted by law").
'" See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 149-50.
141 See id. at 1527 (stating that "the court, invoking Younger v. Harris, concluded that the
duty of the federal court was to abstain from exercising jurisdiction where such exercise would
interfere with the ongoing prosecution by the state of a criminal case") (citations omitted).
" See id. (explaining that "the district court... undertook to 'balance the equities' and
held that [defendant's] rights to a fair trial outweighed the First Amendment Rights of (the
clergy]").
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state court, but had been told by the court that their arguments would not
be considered. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit found that the taping of the
confession violated the RFRA, and found that the RFRA's statutory de-
fense (that is, that it was taped in furtherance of a compelling governmen-
tal interest, using the least restrictive means) had not been proven.'47 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit remanded with directions to enter declaratory and in-
junctive relief.' Although this case related to a taped confession and not
to written documents or records, it seems clear that in other cases where a
litigant could show that the discovery of records would substantially bur-
den the exercise of religion, and where there is no compelling govern-
mental interest, or a demonstration can be made that the least restrictive
means had not been used to further that interest, the same logic would
weigh against disclosure.
I am not aware of other cases where courts have held that the RFRA
protects against the disclosure or production of church documents or rec-
ords. I think this is probably the closest case. However, if the RFRA
emerges wholly or partially intact from the Supreme Court, we will un-
doubtedly see such cases in the future, argued by analogy to Mockaitis, in
the area of records production.
This brings me to potential Fourth Amendment defenses to records
production. The Fourth Amendment is seldom used as an avenue of de-
fense, but it should still be kept in mind. The underlying theory is that the
government-compelled disclosure of church records or documents could
violate the Fourth Amendment, and one would use 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
civil rights action, as the jurisdictional basis for bringing the action. 4 1
Section 1983 provides that any person who, under color of state law, sub-
jects... any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights.., secured by the Consti-
tution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding ......5 0 For a Fourth Amendment
case to be made out, one must first have private communications in which
the claimant has a justifiable and real expectation of privacy.' The limi-
tation, clearly, is that it would only apply to those situations where there is
147 See id. at 1530-31.
141 See id. at 1534.
149 See generally, Terrence T. Kossegi & Barbara Stegun Phair, Note, The Clergy-
Communicant Privilege in the Age of Electronic Surveillance, 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 241, 270-71 (1996) (suggesting that federal and state eavesdropping statutes may
violate the free exercise of religion and the right of privacy).
s0 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
, ' See generally, I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.1(c)(D) (2d ed. 1987).
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both a legitimate and an actual expectation of privacy in a record or docu-
ment, and the violation in question would have to be at the hands of a per-
son acting under color of law, usually termed a "state actor." 52 I should
note that the "state actor" standard is not as narrow as one might think. In
a previous position, I was Associate General Counsel for Litigation of the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (" Amtrak"), and can recall Le-
bron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,5 in which the Supreme Court
found that Amtrak, incorporated in the District of Columbia as a "for
profit" corporation, and not subject to any direct executive branch control,
was, for some purposes, a "state actor." Thus, the "state actor" re-
quirement does not necessarily mean that the Fourth Amendment can be
applied only to the actions of employees of the federal or state govern-
ments.
55
Mockaitis is significant in the Fourth Amendment area because the
Ninth Circuit held that both Fr. Mockaitis and Archbishop George had
justifiable and real expectations of privacy in the communications to Fr.
Mockaitis, in the penitential confession made in the Lane County jail.'56
The court found that the taping of the confession violated Mockaitis' ex-
pectations of privacy." 7 The source of the privacy expectation was two-
fold: First, a state evidence rule, which provided that in the state of Oregon
a " 'member of the clergy shall not, without the consent of the person
making the communication, be examined as to any confidential communi-
cation made to the member of the clergy in the member's professional
character' ";58 and second, the absolute confidentiality which the Catholic
Church accords to penitential confessions.'59 That argument succeeded in
Mockaitis, not only because of the obvious genuineness of the expectation
of privacy, but also because the legitimacy of that expectation was further
bolstered by a useful state evidence rule. As a result, the Ninth Circuit
held that a section 1983 civil rights violation had been established, and in
addition to other relief granted, held that Archbishop George and Fr.
152 See id. at § 1.1(d)(expanding on the relationship and potential conflict between the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Fourth Amendment as it relates to a defendant's constitutional
rights and protections, through a history of Supreme Court decisions).
3 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
"4 See id. at 394 (holding that Amtrak was "an agency or instrumentality of the United
States for the purpose of individual rights guaranteed against the Government by the Constitu-
tion").
... See id. at 397.
'56 See Mockaitis, 104 F.3d at 1531; see also supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text.
" See Mockaitis, 104 F.3d at 1534. The court remanded the case for a grant of plaintiff's
request for declaratory relief. See id.
' Id. at 1531-32 (quoting OR. REv. STAT. § 40.260 (1997)).
"9 See id. at 1532.
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Mockaitis were entitled to an injunction and to their attorneys' fees.' 60
However, as with the RFRA issue in Mockaitis, I am unaware of any other
cases that have dealt specifically with the Fourth Amendment in a church-
records-production scenario.'
6
'
III. STATE AND COMMON LAW DEFENSES
I have left for last a discussion of available state and common law de-
fenses. It would seem clear that the most obvious source of protection
from disclosure could be one's state law of evidentiary privilege. All
states have such privileges in place. 62  The problem, of course, is that
'60 See id. at 1533-34.
161 At least one line of cases indicates, by way of analogy, that under the Fourth Amend-
ment a defendant's bank records generally are not protected from disclosure. See, e.g., United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (stating that financial statements, bank checks and
deposit slips obtained from a bank in a criminal prosecution are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Brown, 600 F.2d 248, 255-56 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that
summons for records directed at third party bank records are generally valid); United States v.
Blackwood, 582 F.2d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding that production of bank records,
including signature cards, deposit and withdrawal slips, bank statements, cancelled checks, loan
ledgers and loan applications, which records had been produced and maintained by banks and
credit unions for their own business purposes, were not violative of taxpayer's Fourth Amend-
ment rights). However, the courts in the bank records cases have explicitly stated that bank rec-
ords are discoverable because the records are seen as the bank's rather than the depositors', de-
spite the fact that the information in the records either came from or relates to the depositor.
Thus, the defendant bank customer holds no reasonable expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Miller,
425 U.S. at 442 (noting a "lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the infor-
mation kept in bank records"); Brown, 600 F.2d at 256 (holding that the appellants had no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy for the purposes of their Fourth Amendment claims).
162 See ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1997); ALASKA R. EVID. 506 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-4062 (West 1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-41-101 (1989); CAL. EViD. CODE §§
1030-1034 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN § 13-90-107(l)(c) (West 1997); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-146b (West 1991); DEL. R. EVID. 505; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West Supp.
1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (1995); HAW REV. STAT. § 624-45 (1988 & Supp. 1989);
IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (Supp. 1997); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (West 1992); IND. CODE
§ 3446-3-2 (Michie 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West Supp. 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-429 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210 (Michie 1989); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 511
(West 1995); ME. R. EVID. § 505 (1998); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-111 (1989);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20A (1986); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 600.2156 (West 1986); MINN.
STAT. § 595-02(1)(c) (West Supp. 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1997); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 491.060(4) (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-
506 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.255 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516.35
(1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 1998); N.M. R. EVID. § 11-506 (1998); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 4505 (Consol. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1996); N.D. R. EVID. 505 (1998);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(C) (Anderson Supp. 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505
(West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.260 (1997); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (West 1982);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 19-13-16 TO 19-13-18 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (Supp.
1997); TEX. R. EVID. 505 (1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(3) (1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12 § 1607 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
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these statutes may not be very useful, for a variety of reasons. Many are
clearly oriented to confessions only. 63 Many say nothing at all about pro-
tecting documents, and extend the privilege only to preclude the clergyman
from testifying." Third, they may contain provisions that are problematic
concerning to whom the privilege belongs. 65 Specifically, they may state,
and many do, that the privilege belongs only to the individual who is
making the statements, and not to the clergy member to whom they are
made. 166 However, such statutes may still be useful because, as in
Mockaitis, they may establish an additional foundation for clergymen to
demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy, as part of the proof of a
Fourth Amendment or section 1983 claim.
There is also some basis, particularly in federal court and some states,
5.60.060(3) (West. Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 57-3-9 (1997); WIS. STAT. § 905.06 (1995-96);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § i-12-101(a)(ii) (Michie 1997); see also JOHN C. BUSH & WILLIAM
TIEMANN, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE: PRIVILEGED CLERGY COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW 102
(3d ed. 1989) (discussing the evolution and scope of the clergy penitent privilege, and noting
that it exists in some form in every state); James W. Hilliard, The Public's Right to Evidence-
Sometimes: The Clergy Testimonial Privilege, 83 ILL. B.J. 182, 183 (1995) (stating that, while
the privilege may not be required by the federal constitution, it is widely accepted by the
American legal system); Karen L. Ross, Revealing Confidential Secrets: Will It Save Our
Children?, 28 SErON HALL L. REV. 963, 976 (1998) (stating that New York was the first state to
have a clergy-communicant privilege and all other states have followed); Ronald J. Colombo,
Note, Forgive Us Our Sins: The Inadequacies of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 225, 230 (1998) (giving an overview of the development of the clergy-penitent privilege
and mentioning its prominence in every state); Michael J. Mazza, Note, Should Clergy Hold the
Priest Penitent Privilege, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 171, 182 (1998) (noting that the state statutes vary
in scope, but all states have adopted the privilege).
3 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (Supp. 1997) (restricting privilege to "any confes-
sion"); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-803 (West 1993) (limiting the privilege to "a confession or
admission" and to "any information which has been obtained by him or her in such professional
character or as a spiritual advisor); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2156 (West 1986) (extend-
ing privilege to "confessions"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973) (restricting scope of
privilege to "religious confessional").
16 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.255 (1994) (stating only that the clergyman may not
"be examined as a witness"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1996) (stating that no clergyman
"shall be competent to testify"); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie Supp. 1997) (stating that
no accredited practitioner "shall be required to give testimony as a witness or to relinquish
notes, records or any written documentation..."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(3) (West
Supp. 1998) (stating that "[a] member of the clergy or a priest shall not... be examined...").
163 For discussions concerning who holds the clergy-penitent privilege, see J. Michael Keel,
Law and Religion Collide Again: The Priest-Penitent Privilege in Child Abuse Reporting Cases,
28 CUMB. L. REV. 681, 685-87 (1997-98), Mazza, supra note 164, at 185-91, and Charles Rob-
ert Steringer, Comment, The Clergy-Penitent Privilege in Oregon, 76 OR. L. REV. 173, 182-84
(1997).
16 See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4505 (McKinney's 1992) (stating that "[u]nless the person
confessing or confiding waives the privilege, a clergyman... shall not be allowed [to] disclose a
confession or confidence made to him in his professional character as spiritual advisor") (em-
phasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Colombo, supra note 164, at 234.
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for a claim of common law privilege.'67 This typically is found to apply
where an oral sacramental confession, or something very closely akin to it,
is in question.168
The seminal case in the United States, which contains language that
still rings true to this day, is People v. Phillips.'69 The court wrote, in lan-
guage that aligns this case with the Free Exercise cases noted above:
It is essential to the free exercise of a religion, that its ordinances should
be administered - that its ceremonies as well as its essentials should be
protected. The sacraments of a religion are its most important ele-
ments .... Secrecy is the essence of penance. The sinner will not con-
fess, nor will the priest receive his confession, if the veil of secrecy is re-
moved: To decide that the minister shall promulgate what he receives in
confession, is to declare that there shall be no penance; and this important
branch of the Roman Catholic religion would thus be annihilated. 7
By analogy, it might be possible to try to protect documents and rec-
ords by arguing a similar impact on other vital functions of a church.
There are, however, some situations where the clergy-penitent privi-
lege has been applied to protect communications made outside of the tra-
ditional penitential confession.'7 ' These situations include disclosures
made to a nun acting as a spiritual director of a school'72 and communica-
tions with elders of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
167 The first reported federal case recognizing the clergy privilege on the basis of common
law is Mullen v. United States. 263 F.2d 275, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (holding an admission of a
crime to a minister is a "privileged communication"). After Mullen many federal courts began
to recognize the common law clergy privilege. See, e.g., In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435
(C.D. Cal. 1971) (invoking the Mullen concurrence). The privilege was ultimately recognized by
the Supreme Court in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 45 (1980) (acknowledging the ex-
istence of the privilege in dicta); see also In re Grand Jury Investigations, 918 F.2d 374, 377 (3d
Cir 1990) (holding that the clergy-communicant privilege protects communications to members
of the clergy in professional capacity).
161 See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 ("The priest-penitent privilege recognizes the human need
to disclose to a spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be
flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in return."); Verplank,
329 F. Supp. at 435-36 (concluding that draft counseling services when rendered by a clergy-
man were performed within the course of his function as a clergyman and were privileged);
Mullen, 263 F.2d at 277 ("the privilege if it exists includes a confession by a penitent to a min-
ister in his capacity as such").
169 See Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F. 3d 1522 (1997).
I70 d. at 1532 (quoting People v. Phillips, N.Y.Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813), as reported by a law-
yer who participated in the case as amicus curiae and as reprinted in Privileged Communications
to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAWYER 199, 207 (1955)).
1' See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2, 4 (2d Cir. 1971) ("While the privilege has
been recognized in the federal courts it appears to be restricted to confidential confession or
other confidential communications .... ) (emphasis added).
1 See Eckmann v. Bd. of Educ., 106 F.R.D. 70 (E.D. Mo. 1985). But see In re Murtha, 279
A.2d 889, 893 (holding that priest-penitent privilege could not be claimed by Catholic nun).
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which does not have ordained clergy. 7 Again, these situations involved
oral statements; they can be argued by analogy to try and protect docu-
ments and records, but they will not be directly on point.
Finally, I want to touch upon one potential defense that is an admitted
"long shot." That is, to find out whether your state has a version of the
federal Privacy Act'74 and to use it. Some states have them, and the un-
derlying idea behind the Privacy Act and its state-level progeny was to
keep the government from disclosing private information that it held on
individuals, for any but a certain number of legitimate purposes that Con-
gress was willing to provide for.'75 These privacy acts may not provide
adequate protection from disclosure of documents in that they all, to my
knowledge, permit disclosures to be made pursuant to "order[s] of a court
of competent jurisdiction." '76 However, there is federal case law indicat-
ing that courts will strictly construe this exception, requiring a litigant to
make a particularized showing of need for those records or documents, to a
court, before they may be obtained from the government.'77 Similarly, a
conventional discovery subpoena or federal grand jury subpoena is not an
"order of a court of competent jurisdiction" which would justify the dis-
closure of records or documents from government files. 78 Obviously, this
would only secure protection against a state or federal instrumentality dis-
closing records that it already had in its possession, and for that reason will
be of limited value. Nevertheless, it is an available alternative.
I have provided an Appendix to this article, in which I have tried to
provide a brief outline of state document production/religious privilege
cases that may useful to a practitioner. I have not emphasized state cases
in this presentation, so these may be of interest.
i7 See Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. 610, 619 (D. Utah 1990) (holding that communica-
tions passed up vertically from one authority to another within the church hierarchy retained the
privilege of protection from discovery).
'74 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1998).
175 See id. at § 552a(b) (stating "[n]o agency shall disclose any record which is contained in
a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except
pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the
record pertains" and then providing for specific exceptions).
176 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(l 1) (1998).
177 See, e.g., Stiles v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 453 F. Supp. 798, 800 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (limit-
ing the exception to "cases in which, for compelling reasons, the court specifically directs that a
record be disclosed"); Doe v, DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that a fed-
eral grand jury subpoena is not an order of a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to Vet-
eran's Records Statute, which has explicitly adopted the Privacy Act).
178 See DiGenova, 779 F.2d at 79 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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APPENDIX
In my article, little emphasis was given to state cases. This was by de-
sign, since they frequently turn on state-specific statutory or common law
provisions. The following is a brief outline of some state document pro-
duction/religious privilege cases of which I am aware.
Arizona:
Curry v. Even (unreported). For discussion, see William H. Ball, Cur-
rent Litigation, 29 CATH. LAW. 207, 215 (1984). Parishioners who were
being sued for libel by a priest sought diocesan records. The Bishop's mo-
tion to quash the records subpoena was denied without opinion. Court of
appeals affirmed without opinion, and the Supreme Court of Arizona de-
nied review. See id.; see also Sherman v. State, 279 S.W. 353 (Ark. 1926)
(limiting clergy-communicant privilege to doctrinally required confes-
sions).
Connecticut:
Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. CV-93-
0300272S, 1994 WL 700344, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994) (distinguishing
Luddy and granting diocese's motion for protective order).
District of Columbia:
Burns v. Chleboski, Civil Action No. 92-4956 (D.C. Super. Ct., Feb.
11, 1993) (agreeing, in part, with Luddy, but arguably limited to non-
privileged, relevant, documents).
Kentucky:
Hughes v. Weir, No. 93-CA-388-OA, 1993 WL 17679, at *1 (Ky. Ct.
App. May 28, 1993) (explaining that material from Canon 489 church ar-
chives was protected from production to grand jury, by a state privilege
statute that covered "religious counseling" as well as confession). But see
Kentucky v. Hughes, 873 S.W.2d 828 (Ky. 1994) (holding that the contro-
versy in Hughes v. Weir was rendered moot by the discharge of the grand
jury).
Minnesota:
Minnesota v. Orfi, 511 N.W.2d 464 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding
a criminal conviction, despite erroneous admission into evidence of confi-
dential communications falling within state clergy-communications privi-
lege).
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Montana:
Montana v. Burns, 830 P.2d 1318 (Mont. 1992) (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Montana's motion to
discover the Diocese's personnel records); KB. v. Roman Catholic Bishop
and Diocese of Great Falls, No. ADV-88-1174 (Mont. 8th Jud. Dist., Feb.
2, 1990) (holding that archive documents were not discoverable in civil
trial).
Ohio:
Niemann v. Cooley, 637 N.E.2d 943 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that a Catholic church cannot avoid inspection of notes made by psycholo-
gists who examined the priest alleged to have molested a child, in context
of a civil suit, merely by placing them in "secret archives").
Pennsylvania:
Hutchison v. Luddy, 606 A.2d 905 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (permitting
discovery of relevant non-privileged documents held in "secret archives").
The court based its decision on findings that the diocese had not shown
that the records in question were privileged, and had not demonstrated
adequately that they fell within statutory clergy privilege. See id. at 908.
For a case distinguishing Luddy, see Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic
Diocesan Corp., No. CV-93-0300272S, 1994 WL 700344, at "1, (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1994). See also Pennsylvania v. Stewart, 690 A.2d 195 (Pa.
1997) (rejecting claims that records placed in "secret archives" were ipso
facto protected from disclosure or discovery pursuant to First Amend-
ment). The Diocese could not avoid in camera review, but could make all
relevancy, privilege, and confidentiality arguments as part of that process.
See id. at 195-96; Pennsylvania v. Patterson, 572 A.2d 1258 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1990) (admitting a priest's testimony of defendant's confession when
the statements made were not motivated by religious considerations);
Fahlfeder v. Pennsylvania, 470 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (limit-
ing statutory clergy-communicant privilege to statements told in confi-
dence to the clergy in their roles as confessors or counselors).
Texas:
Frommer v. Ritter, No. 01-95-01480-CV, 1996 WL 15638, at *1
(Tex. App.- Hous. Jan 18, 1996) (overruling a motion for leave to file for a
writ of mandamus against a district court judge who refused to order pro-
duction, to a plaintiff in a contested divorce, of documents created by
church or provided to church in earlier annulment proceedings, which were
in the sole possession of the records custodian of the Diocese of
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Galveston-Houston). Texas has evidence rules protecting disclosures made
privately to clergy and not intended for disclosure to others, where infor-
mation is conveyed to clergy in their professional character as spiritual ad-
visors. See Nicholson v. Wittig, 832 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App. 1992) (refus-
ing to order clergyman to relate statements regarding delay in treatment, in
a medical malpractice case, that the plaintiff made to him in his role as
hospital chaplain, not as part of a penitential confession); Simpson v. Ten-
nant, 871 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. App. 1994) (holding that a minister in a tort
case involving a child injured on church playground equipment, did not
have to identify the individual who had given him information about the
safety of playground equipment, where the individual was talking to the
minister in his capacity as a spiritual advisor).
Utah:
Scott v. Hammock, 870 P.2d 947 (Utah 1994) (expanding clergy-
communicant privilege to include the practice of providing advice).
Virginia:
Blough v. Food Lion, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 622 (E.D. Va. 1992) (holding
that statutory clergy-communicant privilege for statements made in a con-
fidential manner prohibited its disclosure in a civil action). ** Judgement
vacated by Blough v. Food Lion, Inc., 4 F.3d 984 (4th Cir. 1993).
